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Inmate Abortion Funding in California: A
Constitutional Analysis
INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court's landmark 1973 decision Roe v.
Wade,' women have had a constitutional right to abortion. Roe
has not, however, been the Court's last word on abortion. Because
legislators continue to pass laws which restrict the right to abor-
tion2 the Supreme Court has been forced to reaffirm Roe on sev-
eral occasions.3 One front upon which the abortion right has been
successfully attacked, however, is in the area of funding. Since
1976, Congress has passed legislation restricting access to abor-
tion funding4 and in 1977 the Supreme Court held that there is no
right to abortion funding under the federal constitution.' Despite
this, several states, including California, have upheld the right of
indigents to receive state abortion funding under their respective
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. This type of legislation typically attempts either to: (1) regulate the abortion
process itself (See, e.g., Roe, discussed infra notes 18-35 and accompanying text, where the
state statute in question outlined the circumstances under which abortion would be permis-
sible); (2) subrogate the rights of the pregnant woman and her fetus to the rights of a third
party (See, e.g., Act of Sept. 27, 1987, ch. 1237, 1987 Gen. Sess., a recently enacted
California law which requires minors to obtain written consent from a parent before they
are allowed to have an abortion); (3) limit the availability of abortion funding (See discus-
sion of abortion funding legislation infra notes 36-64 and accompanying text); or (4) in-
crease the cost of abortion by requiring procedures which make abortions more expensive
(See, e.g., Aborted or Miscarried Human Fetuses-Disposition of Remains Act, ch. 238,
1987 Minn. Laws 659 which requires medical facilities in which abortions are performed to
dispose of the remains of a fetus in a "dignified" manner as by cremation or burial).
3. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986) (invalidating requirement that physicians give detailed information
regarding abortion procedure to women desiring abortions); City of Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S 416 (1983) (same); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ash-
croft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (invalidating requirement that second trimester abortions be
performed in a hospital); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (invalidating law pro-
scribing abortions if physician merely "believes" fetus is viable); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (invalidating law requiring minors to obtain parental consent
for abortions).
4. The number of federally funded abortions has dropped dramatically since 1976,
the first year Congress enacted legislation restricting access to federal abortion funding.
See Gold, After the Hyde Amendment: Public Funding for Abortion in F.Y. 1978, 12 FAI.
PLAN. PERSP. 131 (1980). Consequently, indigent women seeking abortions have been
forced to look to state resources and private donations to finance their abortions. Women in
states which do not provide state abortion funding have typically been denied their right to
abortion because of the inadequacy of private abortion financing programs. Committee to
Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 275-76, 625 P.2d 779, 793, 172
Cal. Rptr. 866, 880 (1981).
5. See infra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
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state constitutions.' A question that remains unanswered, how-
ever, is whether California state inmates are similarly entitled to
state funding for abortions.7
The California Department of Corrections (CDC) funds in-
mates' abortions performed in the first trimester of pregnancy, but
normally withholds state funding for abortions performed beyond
the first trimester." On the other hand, nonincarcerated women in
California are eligible to receive state funding for abortions per-
formed through the second trimester of pregnancy.9 Thus, by not
funding inmates' second trimester abortions, the CDC restricts in-
mates' access to government benefits available to nonincarcerated
women.
This Comment assesses tlie constitutionality of the CDC's abor-
tion funding policy. It concludes that the policy is unconstitutional
in two respects. First, the policy impermissibly infringes on in-
mates' rights to abortion in light of the California Constitution
which stringently safeguards personal privacy rights. Second, as a
penal restriction, the policy is inconsistent with the fundamental
objectives underlying the prison system.
It will be helpful at the outset to analyze both the parameters of
the right to abortion, and the history of the right to abortion fund-
6. Massachusetts was the first state to judicially declare such right. Moe v. Secre-
tary of Admin. and Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981). In California, the right
of indigents to receive state abortion funding was upheld in the face of a legislative attempt
to restrict such right in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d
252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981) See infra notes 48-64 and accompanying
text. Other state courts have also heard challenges against legislative abortion funding re-
strictions. See, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Supp. 394, 515 A.2d 134 (1986); Right to
Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982); Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Human Resources, 297 Or. 562, 687 P.2d 785 (1984); Fischer v. Department of
Pub. Welfare, 509 Pa. 293, 502 A.2d 114 (1985).
7. In 1985, an inmate at the California Institute for Women brought suit for de-
claratory and injunctive relief after being denied an abortion at state expense by the Cali-
fornia Department of Corrections. The San Bernardino County Superior Court granted a
temporary restraining order, ordering the Department of Corrections to provide the inmate
with an abortion free of charge. Scrape v. McCarthy, No. OCV-36620 (Cal. Super. Ct.
San Bernardino County Oct. 3, 1985) (order granting preliminary injunction).
The constitutionality of the Department of Corrections abortion funding policy is cur-
rently being challenged by the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California.
Scrape v. McCarthy, No. OCV-36620 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Bernardino County) (Verified
First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief filed July 7, 1987).
8. There is no official or written CDC policy concerning the funding of inmate
abortions. However, the California Institute for Women has stated that the CDC will pay
for abortions performed within the first trimester of pregnancy. Beyond the first trimester,
the CDC only funds "therapeutic" inmate abortions, i.e., those abortions which are neces-
sary for the health and welfare of the pregnant inmate based on a physician's medical
assessment and judgment. Telephone interview with Dr. K.K. Srivastava, Medical Director
for the California Institute for Women (Aug. 24, 1987). This comment addresses itself
only to the situation in which an inmate seeks a nontherapeutic abortion.
9. See infra notes 48-64 and accompanying text.
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ing. This background puts the CDC's abortion funding policy in
the proper context for constitutional analysis.10
I. ABORTION AND ABORTION FUNDING: RELEVANT
BACKGROUND
A. The Right to Abortion in California
Four years before the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Roe v. Wade, the California Supreme Court recognized the
constitutional right to abortion. In People v. Belous," California's
highest court announced that the implied right of privacy which
exists under both the California Constitution12 and the Federal
Constitution 3 gives women the fundamental right to choose
whether to bear children. 4
The court acknowledged that statutes prohibiting abortion
served a valid state interest in protecting maternal health when
originally enacted.'5 However, the court ruled that because mod-
ern medical advancements had made hospital abortions performed
10. Although instances of pregnancy in prison are relatively rare compared to the
general public, inmates are entitled to extended and overnight conjugal visits with members
of their immediate family. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 3174 (1982).
11. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
12. California courts have long recognized an implicit right of privacy under the
California Constitution. See, e.g., Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d
225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970) (financial disclosure for public officials); People v. Edwards, 71
Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969) (search and seizure); Parrish v. Civil
Service Commission, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967) (unan-
nounced raids on the homes of welfare recipients); Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198
P.2d 17 (1948) (interracial marriage); Custudio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 463 (1967) (female sterilization). Also, in 1972, the right of privacy was made ex-
plicit when Californians voted to amend article 1, section 1, of the California Constitution
to read: "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and pro-
tecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST.
art. I, § I (emphasis added).
13. The Federal Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. How-
ever, the United States Supreme Court recognizes that a right of privacy does exist under
the Constitution, and that the root of that right may be found in the penumbras of the Bill
of Rights, most particularly, from the first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth amend-
ments. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (dissemination of contracep-
tives); Stanely v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to view obscene materials in the
privacy of one's own home); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (search and
seizure); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (use of contraceptives); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (minors' rights to sell newspapers on public streets);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (sterilization, marriage, and procreation);
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (right of criminal defendants to be free from
double jeopardy); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right of parents to
send their children to private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to
teach foreign language in public schools).
14. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d at 963, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
15. Id. at 964-65, 458 P.2d at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
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in the early stages of pregnancy as safe as childbirth, 6 the state
could no longer justify depriving women of the right to first tri-
mester abortions in the name of maternal health.1" The question
as to whether the state could ever constitutionally regulate the
abortion decision was not addressed. That question, however, was
soon answered by the United States Supreme Court.
B. The Right to Abortion and the United States Supreme
Court: Roe v. Wade
In 1973, the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade"' held that a stat-
ute which permitted abortion only to save the life of the expectant
mother was unconstitutional.' The Court ruled that the implicit
right of privacy which exists under the Federal Constitution 0 "is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy."21
The right to abortion is not absolute, however, for it is limited
by the state's interests in maternal health and the potential life of
the fetus.22 The Roe Court found these interests to be "separate
and distinct" and to "grow[] in substantiality as the woman ap-
proaches term. 23 Consequently, the degree of regulation which
the state may assert over the abortion procedure increases as a
woman's pregnancy advances."
The Roe Court employed a trimester analysis 25 to delineate the
periods in which government regulation of the abortion procedure
would be proper. The Court ruled that in the first trimester of
pregnancy, neither the state's interest in maternal health nor the
potential life of the fetus is great enough to justify state regulation
of the abortion procedure.26 The state's, interest in maternal health
16. Id. at 965, 458 P.2d at 200-01, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61. Surgical advances such
as antisepsis and asepsis and the development of antibiotics are major medical advance-
ments of the 20th century which have reduced the health risks associated with abortion. Id.
at 965, 458 P.2d at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
17. Id. at 967, 458 P.2d at 202, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 362. The court also expressed
concern with the problem of self induced and black market abortions which were common
prior to the legalization of abortion. id. at 965-66, 458 P.2d at 201, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19. Id. at 164.
20. See supra note 13.
21. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
22. The Court premised this analytical framework by stating that pregnant women
are not isolated in their privacy. Id. at 159. The Court also said that a person has never
had an absolute "right to do with one's body as one pleases." Id. at 154.
23. Id. at 162-63.
24. Id. at 163.
25. For analytical purposes, the Court divided the pregnancy period into roughly
equal trimesters. The first trimester encompasses weeks 1-13, the second, weeks 14-25, and
the third, weeks 26-38. See id. at 125.
26. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
[Vol. 24
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is minimal at this time because the health risks for women under-
going hospital abortions in the early stages of pregnancy are no
greater than those associated with childbirth." The Court further
asserted that because an unborn is not considered a "person"
within the language and meaning of the fourteenth amendment,
the state could not have an overriding interest in the potential life
of a nonviable28 fetus.29 Hence, because the state does not have a
compelling interest in regulating pregnancy during the first tri-
mester, women are free to choose to obtain an abortion without
state interference at this time."
In the second trimester, the state's interest in maternal health
increases due to the increased health risks which then accompany
abortions.31 Consequently, the state is empowered to regulate the
abortion decision in ways reasonably related to the pregnant wo-
man's health. 2 Thus, during the second trimester, a woman's
right to choose abortion may be regulated according to the state's
concern for her health. 3
In the third trimester, the fetus has likely reached the point of
viability. The state's interest in potential life takes precedence
over the pregnant woman's right of privacy at this time because
the fetus is capable of living outside the mother's womb.34 There-
fore, abortion may be regulated or even proscribed in the third
trimester, unless an abortion is necessary to preserve the pregnant
woman's life or health.35
27. Id. at 149.
28. "Viability" is the point in a woman's pregnancy at which time the fetus has
"attained such form and development of organs as to be normally capable of living outside
the uterus." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2548 (3d ed. 1971).
29. Roe, 410 U.S at 156-63. Viability normally occurs in the third trimester of
pregnancy. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
30. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
31. See Grimes, Second-Trimester Abortions in the United States, 16 FAt. PLAN.
PERSP. 260 (1984).
32. The Court listed requirements as to qualifications of the person who is to per-
form the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the proce-
dure is to be performed; as to the licensing of the facility as examples of permissible state
regulation in this area. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. In 1967, California passed the Therapeutic
Abortion Act, ch. 232, § 1, Stat. 1535 (1967) to regulate the abortion procedure for the
protection of pregnant women. Advances in abortion techniques, however, have outdated
many of the provisions originally enacted in the Act. It is now undisputed that abortions
performed by the dilatation and evacuation (D&E) technique up to the eighteenth week of
pregnancy are at least twice as safe as childbirth. Forrest, Sullivan & Tietze, Abortion in
the United States, 1977-78, 11 FAM. PLAN. PERsP. 329-41 (1979). Also, post-first trimester
abortions may now be performed safely in clinics. M.S. BURNHILL, RISKS. BENEFITS AND
CONTROVERSIES IN FERTILITY CONTROL 331-47 (1978). Consequently, since its enactment
in 1967, many of the provisions of the Therapeutic Abortion Act have been invalidated.
See, e.g., People v. Barksdale, 8 Cal. 3d 320, 503 P.2d 257, 105 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972).
33. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
34. Id. at 163-64.
35. Id.
1988]
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In summary, Roe states that it is not until the third trimester of
a woman's pregnancy that the state can effectively veto her deci-
sion to have an abortion. Prior to that time, the pregnant woman
is free to obtain an abortion without any, or at most minimal, in-
terference from the state.
C. The Right to Federal Abortion Funding
Despite the fact that women have a constitutional right to abor-
tion, the Supreme Court has ruled that they do not have a federal
constitutional right to abortion funding from the federal govern-
ment. In Maher v. Roe,"6 the Court upheld a state regulation
which prohibited the use of Medicaid funds to reimburse women
for the cost of abortions.37 The Court found that failure to fund
abortions for indigent women did not create a suspect classifica-
tion,3 8 or impinge on a fundamental right.39 In so concluding, the
Court declared that the regulation did not impose any restriction
on the right to abortion which was not already there and thus did
not unduly burden such right.40 Applying the rational relationship
test of constitutionality, 41 the Court found that encouraging child-
birth was sufficient justification to deny women access to federal
abortion funding.42
A second landmark decision dealing with the federal abortion
funding issue is Harris v. McRae.43 In Harris, the Supreme Court
went a step further than it did in Maher in upholding the consti-
tutionality of the 1979 Hyde Amendment," which placed even
36. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
37. Only "medically necessary" first trimester abortions were to be federally funded
under this regulatory scheme. Funding for nontherapuetic abortions was prohibited. Id. at
466.
38. The Court stated that because financial need alone does not create a suspect
class for the purposes of equal protection analysis, no such suspect class could be formed by
those unable to pay for an abortion. Id. at 471.
39. Id. at 474.
40. Id. at 473-74. However, Justice Brennan has observed that "[b]y funding all of
the expenses associated with childbirth and none of the expenses incurred in terminating
pregnancy, the Government literally makes an offer that the indigent woman cannot afford
to refuse." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 333-34 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. A statute will not be set aside under the rational relationship test if any set of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426
(1961).
42. Maher, 432 U.S. at 478.
43. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
44. Since 1976, Congress has annually enacted the Hyde Amendment, restricting
federal abortion funding. The 1978 version examined in Harris prohibited federal funding
of abortions "except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were
carried to term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for victims of rape or
incest when such rape or incest has been reported promptly." Act of Nov. 20, 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923-26 (1979).
[Vol. 24
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tighter restrictions on the use of Medicaid funds for abortions
than the regulation upheld in Maher.45 The Court reasoned that
because the government does not create a woman's indigency, it is
not obligated to remove such an obstacle from the path of a wo-
man's exercise of her abortion right.4 6 Together, Maher and Har-
ris establish that federal abortion funding is not a constitutional
right.47
D. The Right to State Abortion Funding in California
California legislators responded to the federal abortion funding
decisions by enacting provisions in the California Budget Act re-
stricting access to state abortion funding.4 8 The enactments re-
quired women to forfeit their constitutional right to abortion in
order to qualify for pregnancy-related medical benefits available
through the Medi-Cal program.49
In Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers,5" the
California Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of this
legislative scheme. While fulfilling its "independent legal obliga-
tion" to review the funding restrictions under the California
Constitution,51 the court rejected the reasoning of federal prece-
45. Harris, 448 U.S. at 326-27.
46. The Court, reiterating Maher, stated that "although government may not place
obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove
those not of its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category." Id. at 316. The Court
added that "[a]lthough the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection
against unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice in the context of cer-
tain personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary
to realize all the advantages of that freedom." Id. at 317-18.
47. These two federal abortion funding cases, along with the connected cases Wil-
liams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980) and Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), have been
heavily criticized. See, e.g., Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the
Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRea, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1113
(1980); Simson, Abortion, Poverty and the Equal Protection of the Laws, 13 GA. L. REV.
505 (1979).
48. The enactments essentially limited abortion funding to those cases where preg-
nancy would endanger the mother's life or cause her severe and long lasting physical health
damage, where pregnancy was the result of illegal intercourse, or where abortion was nec-
essary to prevent the birth of severally defective infants. 1978 Budget Act, ch. 359, Stat.
755; 1979 Budget Act, ch. 259, Stat. 576; 1980 Budget Act, ch. 510, Stat. 1069.
49. These kinds of restrictions, which force people to choose between public benefits
and constitutionally protected rights have been called "unconstitutional conditions" and
have been widely discussed. See, e.g., O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Bene-
fits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); West-
ern, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture of An-
other, 66 IOWA L. REV. 741 (1981).
50. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
51. "[S]tate courts, in interpreting constitutional guarantees contained in state con-
stitutions, are 'independently responsible for safeguarding the rights of their citizens.'" Id.
at 261, 625 P.2d at 783, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 870 (quoting People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d
1988]
7
Vukson: Inmate Abortion Funding in California: A Constitutional Analysis
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
dent52 and asserted that any governmental program which condi-
tions receipt of benefits on the forfeiture of a constitutional right
demands special scrutiny.5"
The court thus thrust a heavy burden on the state to justify the
withholding of benefits from pregnant women wishing to exercise
their abortion right.54 To pass constitutional muster, the state
would have to demonstrate (1) that the funding restrictions re-
lated to Medi-Cal's purpose of providing health care to medically
indigent persons; (2) that the public benefits which result from the
funding restrictions greatly outweigh any resulting injury to a wo-
man's right to abortion; and (3) that it is impossible for the state
to further its objectives by any less offensive alternative.55
The court found the abortion funding restrictions deficient on
all three counts. First, the restrictions bore no relation to the pur-
pose of the Medi-Cal Program.56 In fact, by denying assistance to
women wishing to exercise their constitutional right to -abortion,
the restrictions impeded Medi-Cal's purpose of aiding those in
need of medical help. 57
Second, the court said that the utility of imposing the proposed
restrictions on abortion did not manifestly outweigh the resulting
impairment of constitutional rights.58 Any money saved by not
funding indigents' abortions would be spent on their maternity
care, childbirth expenses and child support. 5 Thus, the restric-
tions did not serve the state interest of preserving fiscal re-
sources.60 Moreover, the state's expressed interest in protecting a
nonviable fetus did not outweigh the woman's fundamental right
to an abortion.6
Finally, the restrictions failed the least offensive alternative re-
quirement because the state could meet the childbirth needs of
528, 549-50, 531 P.2d 1099, 1111-13, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 328-30 (1975)) (emphasis in
original).
52. See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
53. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
54. Id. at 265, 625 P.2d at 786, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 873. (quoting Bagley v. Washing-
ton Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966)).
55. Myers, 29 Cal.3d at 258, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868. This standard
was first articulated in Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421
P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966).
56. Myers, 29 Cal.3d at 271, 625 P.2d at 790, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
57. Id. at 271-73, 625 P.2d at 790-91, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78.
58. Id. at 273-82, 625 P.2d at 791-97, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878-84.
59. Id. at 277, 625 P.2d at 794, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 278-82, 625 P.2d at 794-97, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 881-84. This point was
decided in Roe. See infra notes 18-35 and accompanying text. The court added that even if
protection of a nonviable fetus was a compelling state interest, it would still be likely that
the restrictions were unconstitutional because they singled out the poor as victims of this
interest. Id. at 281, 625 P.2d at 796, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
[Vol. 24
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indigent women without burdening their right to abortion by
funding both childbirth and abortion. 2 Therefore, since the state
could not meet its burden under the court's test, the funding re-
strictions were invalidated.63 Myers thus guarantees California
women the right to state abortion funding under the California
Constitution. 4
II. THE CDC's ABORTION FUNDING POLICY AND THE
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
The CDC's abortion funding policy puts inmates in a situation
very similar to that created by the abortion funding restrictions
invalidated in Myers. As in Myers, women are made to choose
between state funding or an abortion. An inmate will receive state
aid for pregnancy-related expenses if she carries her child to
term.6" However, state aid will be denied should she elect to exer-
cise her abortion right beyond the first trimester.66 Because the
CDC's abortion funding policy makes forfeiture of the right to a
second trimester abortion67 by inmates a condition to their receiv-
ing government benefits, Myers' three-part test is the proper stan-
dard by which to assess its constitutionality.
A. Does the CDC's Abortion Funding Policy Relate to the
Purpose of the Legislation Which Gives Inmates the Right to
Abortion?
The phrasing of the statutory enactments ensuring inmates ac-
cess to abortion sheds only a faint ray of light upon the legislative
intent concerning inmate abortion funding. California Penal Code
section 3405 provides that pregnant inmates shall be "permitted"
to obtain an abortion. 68 When introduced to the legislature, how-
ever, section 3405 required inmates desiring an abortion to be "as-
62. Id. at 282-83, 625 P.2d at 797-98, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85.
63. Id. at 285, 625 P.2d at 799, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
64. Since Myers, California appellate courts have invalidated similar attempts to
restrict state abortion funding. See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v.
Rank, 151 Cal. App. 3d 83, 198 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1984); Committee to Defend Reproduc-
tive Rights v. Cory, 132 Cal. App. 3d 852, 183 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1982). In addition, the
California Supreme Court has been unwilling to rehear the issue. Consequently, nearly
90,000 womer per year receive state funded abortions in California. L.A. Times Nov. 21,
1986, at 3, col. 6.
65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3406 (West 1982).
66. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
67. Since none of the limitations passed by the California legislature to protect ma-
ternal health apply to pregnant inmates (see supra note 32 and accompanying text), an
inmate's right to abortion cannot be restricted in the second trimester of pregnancy.
68. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3405 (West 1982).
1988]
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sisted" in obtaining it.69 The change in section 3405 from "as-
sisted" to "permitted" may evince a legislative intent to
distinguish between an active obligation on behalf of the CDC to
pay for inmate abortions and the more passive role of merely al-
lowing them. 0 If so, the CDC's policy of not funding abortions
performed beyond the first trimester would relate to the purpose
of section 3405. The CDC would not have a legislative direction to
fund any inmate abortions, even those performed in the first
trimester.
There is ample support, however, for a different interpretation
of the CDC's legislative obligation regarding inmate abortion
funding. Section 3350 of Title 15 of the California Administrative
Code mandates that all of an inmate's reasonable medical needs
be provided by the state.7 Since an inmate is absolutely entitled
to terminate her pregnancy under Penal Code section 3405, it is
reasonable to conclude that the state must provide medical ser-
vices necessary to terminate that pregnancy.72
Penal Code section 3405 also provides that no restriction may
be placed on an inmate's right to abortion. 73 This language re-
flects an intent on behalf of the legislature to ensure abortion
funding for inmates since denying indigent inmates abortion fund-
ing formidably restricts their right to abortion. Any restriction on
an inmate's right to abortion, especially the withholding of funds
necessary to procure that procedure, violates the letter and spirit
of Penal Code section 3405.74
Thus, it is unlikely that refusing inmates funding for second tri-
mester abortions relates to the purpose of the legislative enact-
ments which ensure inmates the right to abortion. In fact, the
CDC's policy seemingly contravenes the legislative will by inhib-
iting inmates' access to that procedure.
69. Penal Code section 3405 was originally introduced in the California legislature
on March 13, 1972, as Assembly Bill No. 1004.
70. Bills are construed in their final form, not in their form as originally introduced
in the legislature if subsequent changes have been made. Rich v. State Bd. of Optometry,
235 Cal. App. 2d 591, 607, 45 Cal. Rptr. 512, 522 (1965).
71. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 3350 (1983).
72. The Supreme Court has stated that "deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' proscribed by
the Eighth Amendment." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). Two recent United States District Court cases have
said that refusing to fund inmate abortions violates the eighth amendment in light of Es-
telle's "deliberate indifference" standard. See Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 655
F. Supp. 1300 (W.D. Mo, 1987); Monmouth County Corrections Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro,
643 F. Supp. 1217 (D.N.J. 1986).
73. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3405 (West 1982).
74. The fact that the CDC willfully funds inmate abortions performed in the first
trimester of pregnancy is also relevant. It is unlikely that the CDC would voluntarily fund
first trimester abortions absent a legislative direction to do so.
[Vol. 24
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B. Does the Utility of the CDC's Abortion Funding Policy
Greatly Outweigh any Resulting Injury to Inmates' Rights to
Abortion?
Under this prong of the Myers test, it is necessary to assess the
importance of the state's interests served by the CDC's abortion
funding policy and the degree to which the policy promotes these
interests. Furthermore, the right to abortion and the extent to
which it is impaired by the CDC's policy must be examined. The
CDC must show that valid state interests are served by their pol-
icy and that these interests "manifestly outweigh" any impair-
ment of an inmate's right to abortion.7
1. The Nature of the Right to Abortion-The abortion right
is grounded in the constitutional right of privacy which has been
recognized by the Supreme Court as "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty. '7 6 In Myers, the California Supreme Court said
the right to choose abortion is "central to a woman's control not
only of her own body, but also to the control of her social role and
personal destiny. ' 77 In fact, it is well documented that education
and employment opportunities for a woman are greatly reduced
when she is forced to bear an unwanted child.78
In reality, the state imposes an absolute veto on an indigent in-
mate's abortion right when it fails to fund her abortion. Given the
high cost of inmate abortions and the unlikelihood that inmates
will have sufficient resources to meet these costs, inmates will nor-
mally be forced to have children for whom the state must assume
financial responsibility.7 9 Because the CDC's abortion funding pol-
75. Myers, 29 Cal. 2d at 258, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
76. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) where the Court stated
that "if the right of privacy means anything it is the right of the individual ... to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." (emphasis in original).
77. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 275, 625 P.2d at 792, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
78. See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 641 n.90
(1980).
79. The CDC stated the charge for an inmate's abortion as being five thousand
dollars. This fee includes the cost of the abortion and the cost of the security guards who
are to accompany the inmate to the appropriate medical facility. Scrape v. McCarthy, No.
OCV-36620 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Bernardino County) (Verified Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief filed July 7, 1987). Because an inmate's opportunity to earn money
while incarcerated is limited, it is highly unlikely that an indigent inmate would be able to
afford to pay for her abortion. Compensation to inmates for labor performed may not ex-
ceed one-half the minimum wage provided by federal law. 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 1549 § 6
(amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 2700). Also, 42 C.F.R. § 435.1008 and CAL. WELFARE &
INSTITUTIONS CODE § 14053(a) (West Supp. 1987) prevent inmates from receiving health
care services available to nonincarcerated citizens.
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icy substantially impairs a fundamental constitutional right,80 the
state must show that the policy serves compelling governmental
interests to justify its existence.8
2. State Interests
a. Preserve Fiscal Resources-Preserving fiscal resources is a
legitimate state interest.82 However, refusing to fund inmate abor-
tions does not serve this interest. Any savings produced for the
state by not funding inmate abortions would be wiped out by the
cost of prenatal care.8s Further, the Supreme Court has stated
that "[t]he cost of an ... abortion . ..holds no comparison
whatsoever with the welfare costs that will burden the state for
the new indigent and their support in the long, long years
ahead." 84 Even if it were true that funding inmate abortions pro-
duced an economic burden on the state, that reason alone is insuf-
ficient to override a fundamental right.85
b. Maternal Health-In Roe, the Supreme Court ruled that in
the second trimester of a woman's pregnancy, the state may regu-
late the abortion procedure to protect her health. 86 But even
though the state is justified in imposing restrictions on abortion in
the second trimester, it is not empowered at this time to restrict
the abortion right altogether.87 In fact, because none of the limita-
tions passed by the California legislature to protect maternal
health apply to pregnant inmates,88 inmates cannot have their
abortion right restricted at any stage prior to the third trimester,
the time at which the state's interest in the potential life of the
fetus overrides the woman's right to privacy.'
Moreover, it is conceivable that the CDC's abortion funding
80. A fundamental constitutional right has been defined as one which has its origin
in the express terms of the Constitution or which is necessarily to be implied from those
terms. Sidle v. Majors, 264 Ind. 206, 341 N.E.2d 763, 769 (1973).
81. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 276, 625 P.2d at 793, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
82. Id. at 277, 625 P.2d at 794, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
83. Id. An additional expense for the state is caring for the child of indigent women
denied abortion funding. Id.
84. Id. at 277-78, 625 P.2d at 794, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 881. (quoting Beal v. Doe, 432
U.S. 438, 463 (1977)).
85. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977); Molar v. Gates, 98 Cal. App. 3d 1,
17, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239, 249 (1979).
86. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
87. The state's interest in protecting maternal health is mitigated by the woman's
right to privacy. See supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 431 (1983),
the Supreme Court warned that the state cannot "depart from accepted medical practice"
or increase the costs and limit the availability of abortions "without promoting important
health benefits."
88. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 18-35 and accompanying text.
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policy actually endangers the life and health of inmates desiring
abortions. A denial of funding may induce inmates to attempt
abortions without medical assistance, a procedure which carries a
high risk of injury or death.9" Furthermore, failure of the CDC to
fund abortions will force indigent inmates to carry their unwanted
children to term. This creates psychological stress which has been
shown to increase the health risks associated with childbirth.91
Thus, rather than protecting maternal health, the CDC's policy
impedes this interest by forcing inmates into a situation which is
actually more threatening to their health.
c. The Life of the Fetus-In Roe, the Supreme court held
that the state's interest in the potential life of the fetus does not
become compelling until the third trimester of a woman's preg-
nancy.92 Prior to the third trimester, the woman's right of privacy
is superior to the states interest in potential life.93 Therefore, this
interest cannot justify the CDC's policy of not funding inmate
abortions in the second trimester.
C. Is it Possible for the CDC to Further the State's Interests
in a Less Restrictive Manner?
Because the CDC's abortion funding policy does not preserve
fiscal resources,94 a less restrictive means analysis need not be un-
dertaken as to that state interest. The state's interest in maternal
health, however, is arguably furthered by not funding inmates'
second trimester abortions since health risks related to the abor-
90. Cates & Rochat, Illegal Abortions in the United States, 1972-1974, 8 FANI.
PLAN. PERSP. 86 (1976).
91. In McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (District Court trial
of Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) discussed supra notes 43-47), medical testimony
and case histories were presented demonstrating the impact of unwanted pregnancy on a
woman's mental health. Unwanted pregnancies were found to be a source of severe depres-
sion and anxiety commonly producing psychiatric symptoms and at times leading to sui-
cidal ideation. Califano, 491 F. Supp. at 674-76. Also, the Supreme Court has noted that:
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life
and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health
may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated
with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in
this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood
may be involved.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. Additionally, one study has found that unwanted children are more
likely to lack a secure family life, require psychiatric care, and engage in antisocial and
criminal behavior than children born to mothers desiring childbirth. Califano, 491 F. Supp.
at 677.
92. See supra notes 18-35 and accompanying text.
93. Id.
94. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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tion procedure increase as a woman's pregnancy advances."5
Nonetheless, there are several alternatives to denying inmates
funding for second trimester abortions which would serve the goal
of encouraging inmates desiring abortions to obtain them early in
their pregnancies.
First, through counseling, inmates could be alerted to the health
risks associated with abortions performed beyond the first trimes-
ter. Counseling women into earlier first trimester abortions would
serve the state's interest of protecting maternal health in a less
restrictive manner than denying inmates funding for second tri-
mester abortions.
Second, the state could implement pregnancy testing programs
to discover inmates' pregnancies at an early stage. This would al-
low inmates an opportunity to procure an abortion at a time in
which the procedure is less threatening to their health. A preg-
nancy detection program would facilitate maternal health since it
would lessen the likelihood that an inmate would have to undergo
a post first trimester abortion. Such a program would clearly be a
less ornerous burden on inmates' abortion rights than the CDC's
current abortion funding policy.
In summary, like the statutory scheme invalidated in Myers,
the CDC's policy of not funding inmates' second trimester abor-
tions falls short of satisfying California's rigid test of constitution-
ality. It impedes, rather than furthers, the legislative intent to en-
sure inmates access to abortion. Also, the policy serves no state
interests which outweigh the resulting impairment of an inmate's
fundamental constitutional right to abortion. Finally, because the
CDC's policy is drawn too broadly, it fails the least restrictive al-
ternative requirement. Since the CDC's abortion funding policy
fares no better under constitutional scrutiny than the restrictive
abortion funding statutes struck down in Myers, it too should be
invalidated under the Constitution of the State of California.
III. ABORTION FUNDING IN THE PRISON CONTEXT
An additional ground for attacking the constitutionality of the
CDC's abortion funding policy is that such policy unjustifiably re-
stricts inmates' civil rights. All of an inmate's civil rights are not
lost with the slamming of the jailhouse door. In fact, prison regu-
lations which deprive inmates of constitutionally protected rights
are particularly subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
95. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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A. Necessary Restrictions on Inmates' Rights
At one time, inmates were stripped of all civil rights when im-
prisoned.96 Today, however, inmates' rights may not be so lightly
disregarded. 97 Inmates must be accorded all rights not fundamen-
tally inconsistent with imprisonment98 and any retraction of in-
mates' rights must serve legitimate penological interests.99 The
constitutionality of the CDC's abortion funding policy as a restric-
tion on inmates' rights is determined by analyzing the nature of
the right to abortion and the penological interests served by re-
stricting such right.1"' The state must show that restricting in-
mates' access to abortion funding serves the interests of incarcera-
tion.""' Before proceeding with this analysis, it is important to
determine the proper standard of review used in assessing the con-
stitutionality of prison regulations.
96. This approach, termed "civil death," entirely suspended the civil rights of the
imprisoned. 1968 Cal. Stat. ch. 1402, § 1, at 2763 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600);
repealed by 1975 Cal. Stat. ch. 1175, § 3 at 2897.
97. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (West 1982) provides that:
A person sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison may, during any such period
of confinement, be deprived of such rights, and only such rights, as is necessary in
order to provide for the reasonable security of the institution in which he is con-
fined and for the reasonable protection of the public.
See also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (inmates retain substantial religious freedom
under the first and fourteenth amendments upon imprisonment); Younger v. Gilmore, 404
U.S. 15 (1971) (inmates retain right of access to the courts upon imprisonment); Lee v.
Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (inmates are protected under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment from invidious discrimination based on race).
Nonetheless, prison officials do have discretion to restrict a variety of inmates' rights.
See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (condoning prison searches which invade
inmates' personal privacy); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (restricting inmates'
rights to communications with the media); Coleman v. District of Columbia Comm'r, 234
F. Supp. 408 (E.D. Va. 1964) (restricting inmates' practice of religion); Gerrish v. Maine,
89 F. Supp. 244 (D.C. Me. 1950) (allowing censorship of inmate mail); In re Price, 25 Cal.
3d 448, 600 P.2d, 158 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1979) (restricting inmates' union meetings); People
v. Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 731, 528 P.2d 1, 117 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1974) (allowing jailhouse conver-
sations between inmates and their spouses to be monitored); California Dept. of Correc-
tions v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. App. 3d 245, 182 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1982) (terminating
inmates' personal contact visits); People v. Estrada, 93 Cal. App. 3d 76, 155 Cal. Rptr. 731
(1979) (permitting regulation of communications between inmates awaiting trial).
98. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984).
99. O'Conner v. Keller, 510 F. Supp. 1359, 1368-69 (D. Md. 1981). The Supreme
Court has stated that inmates' rights may be restricted in furtherance of any penological
objective including, but not limited to, retribution, deterrence, protection of society and
rehabilitation. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 243 n.13 (1949).
100. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), the Court stated that "there
must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provi-
sions of the constitution that are of general application."
101. O'Conner v. Keller, 510 F. Supp. 1359, 1368-69 (D. Md. 1981).
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B. Standard of Review
Traditionally, courts have taken what has been termed a "hands
off" approach toward review of prison regulations. 10 2 It was be-
lieved that it was not the function of the courts to superintend
treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries. l03 Conse-
quently, courts have invested wide discretion in prison authorities
to determine what restrictions must be placed on inmates'
rights. 0 4 The "hands off" approach toward review of prison regu-
lations has, not surprisingly, been accompanied by a low standard
of review in some cases dealing with the constitutionality of such
regulations. 0 5 Recently, however, significant inroads have been
made into the policy of deferring to the judgment of prison offi-
cials concerning which restrictions on inmates' rights are neces-
sary. This has been achieved primarily through resort to a height-
ened standard of review.
In Procunier v. Martinez,0 6 the Supreme Court reviewed a
CDC policy allowing censorship of inmate mail. 07 Because the
policy infringed inmates' first amendment rights of free speech,
the Court subjected the policy to a rigid standard of review. 08
The Court stated that to be constitutional, the policy must further
one or more of the substantial governmental interests of security,
102. Barning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859
(1954) (holding courts are without power to supervise administration of prisons or to inter-
fere with prison regulations).
103. Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1954) (upheld prison regulation which
prevented inmate known as the "Birdman of Alcatraz" from seeking publication for his
books written while in prison).
Three factors have been identified as contributing to the judiciary's reluctance to become
involved with supervision of prisons. First, management and control of prisons are generally
executive and legislative functions. The judiciary by the doctrine of separation of powers,
has little to say about the running of penal institutions. Second, claims by state prisoners
are not for the federal courts to address, but instead are best left in the hands of state
tribunals. Third, because the management of prisons requires expertise in penological mat-
ters, the judiciary is seldom qualified to speak on what is appropriate prison policy. J.
GOBERT & N. COHEN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 7-9 (1981).
104. Smith v. Schneckloth, 414 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1969); Mathis v. Pratt, 375 F.
Supp. 301, 304 (N.D. I1. 1974).
105. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979) (requiring only a showing
that a prison regulation which allowed invidious searches and seizures upon inmates was
"rationally connected" to the purpose for which it was assigned); Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (while reviewing prison regulations which prohib-
ited labor unions in state prisons, the Court concluded that the restrictions were justified
merely because they were "reasonably related" to the state objective of prison security).
106. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
107. The policy, inter alia, proscribed inmates correspondence that "unduly com-
plain[ed]," "magnifi[ed] grievances," "express[ed] inflammatory political, racial, religious
or other views or beliefs," or contained matter deemed "defamatory" or "otherwise inap-
propriate." Id. at 399-400.
108. Id. at 408.
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order and rehabilitation. 10 9 In addition, the limitation must be no
greater than is necessary for the protection of the government in-
terest involved." 0 Under this demanding standard, the policy was
declared unconstitutional."' Even though mail censorship would
serve the legitimate interest of prison security in some in-
stances, 2 the policy in question swept too broadly in that it al-
lowed censorship of material unthreatening to prison order or
security."'
California courts scrutinize prison regulations with varying de-
grees of intensity. When fundamental constitutional rights are be-
ing suppressed by a regulation, a high standard of review will be
employed to judge its constitutionality." 4 Conversely, a lesser
standard will suffice when analyzing a regulation which does not
infringe upon inmates' fundamental constitutional rights."'
In In re Price,"' the California Supreme Court reviewed a
CDC policy which prohibited inmate union meetings." 7 The stan-
dard of review used in Price was one of reasonableness." 8 It re-
quired only that the policy be reasonably related to the legitimate
state interest of prison security."19 This standard was satisfied on a
showing that the formation of an inmate union would likely create
several security problems at the prison.' 20 Price was decided, how-
ever, on the premise that the policy did not implicate any constitu-
tional right of inmates. 2' Because the policy did not violate any
109. Id. at 413.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 415.
112. The Court listed attempts by inmates to mail escape plans or encoded messages
as examples of when mail censorship would be justified. Id. at 413.
113. The policy allowed censorship of letters "criticizing policy, rules or officials" or
letters with "defamatory" or "disrespectful" remarks. Id. at 415.
Despite more recent Supreme Court decisions reverting back to a more lenient standard
of review of prison regulation (see supra note 105), the Procunier standard is still used by
many federal courts. See, e.g., O'Conner v. Keller, 510 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Md. 1981) and
Salisbury v. List, 501 F. Supp. 105 (D. Nev. 1980).
114. See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
116. 25 Cal. 3d 448, 600 P.2d 1330, 158 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1979).
117. The policy prohibited Soledad State Prison inmates from holding meetings of
the Prisoner's Union at which inmates and noninmates would be present. Id. at 450, 600
P.2d at 1331, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
118. Id. at 453, 600 P.2d at 1332, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 455, 600 P.2d at 1333, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 876. Inmate strikes and regular
contact between inmate and noninmate union representatives were cited as potential secur-
ity problems associated with inmate unions. Id. at 453-54, 600 P.2d at 875-76, 158 Cal.
Rptr. at 1332-3.
121. Id. at 453, 600 P.2d at 1332, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 875. The court stated that
incarceration necessarily prevents prisoners from enjoying unrestricted rights of association
and that the United States Supreme Court, in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union,
433 U.S. 119 (1977), "unequivocally determined" that prisoner union restrictions offend no
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constitutional right of the inmates, the court was justified in using
the lower standard of review.
In Inmates of Sybil Brand Institution for Women v. County of
Los Angeles,1 22 the court used a different standard in reviewing
several CDC regulations being challenged by inmates. Here, the
female inmates alleged unequal treatment and inferior conditions
of confinement as compared to state prisons for men.123 Thus, the
women inmates had cognizable equal protection claims under both
the California Constitution 124 and the Federal Constitution. 25
The court determined that when inmates' fundamental rights are
violated by a prison regulation, such regulation should be subject
to strict scrutiny on review .12 1 The state thus was required to show
that the regulations furthered compelling state interests and that
these interests could not be served in a less restrictive manner.1
2 7
The regulations under review were consequently upheld on a
showing that they advanced prison security and this interest could
not be achieved by less restrictive means. 2 '
Price and Inmates of Sybil Brand demonstrate that the level of
scrutiny a prison regulation should be afforded is determined by
examining the right being restricted by the regulation. If, as in
Price, the right is not fundamental, the regulation need only be
reasonable to be constitutional. However, if the right is fundamen-
tal, as in Inmates of Sybil Brand, the regulation must survive
strict scrutiny to be constitutional. Because the CDC's abortion
funding policy restricts an inmate's fundamental right to abor-
tion, 29 it must pass strict scrutiny to be constitutional.
C. Strict Scrutiny of the CDC's Abortion Funding Policy
Previous analysis of the purported state interests served by the
CDC's abortion funding policy reveals that it is doubtful whether
a restriction on inmates' rights to abortion funding serves any le-
gitimate, let alone compelling, state interest. 3 ' The policy does
not advance any goal of the penal system. Retribution is not jeop-
constitutional right. Id.
122. 130 Cal. App. 3d 39, 181 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1982).
123. The prison regulations under review in this case related to conditions of confine-
ment at a California state prison, e.g., visitation rights, disciplinary procedures, outdoor
recreation facility availability and use of "control" facilities for problem inmates. Id. at 98,
181 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
124. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
125. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
126. Inmates of Sybil Brand, 130 Cal. App. 3d at 99, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 103-12, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 605-11.
129. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
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ardized, criminal activity is not deterred, society is not made
safer, and rehabilitation is not undermined when inmates are pro-
vided abortion funding. 1'
Language from a recent United States District Court deci-
sion 132 addressing the constitutionality of restrictions on inmates'
rights to abortion and abortion funding is relevant in this regard.
The court wrote:
Permitting pregnant inmates to exercise their right to choose
and then to carry through with that decision is in no way incon-
sistent with their status as prisoners or with the goals of the cor-
rectional system. Additionally, the prisons should be and are
constitutionally required to provide for all the serious medical
needs of the inmates, whose financial dependency is. . . a result
of their incarceration. 3'
Since no penological interests are served by restricting inmates'
access to abortion funding, the CDC's abortion funding policy
should be invalidated under the California constitution.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional right to abortion has been the target of both
legislative and judicial attack since the Supreme Court announced
such right in Roe v. Wade. But like other efforts to dilute the
right to abortion, the CDC's attempt to restrict the availability of
abortion by limiting funding for that procedure is
unconstitutional.
In California, state actions which force people to forego consti-
tutional rights in order to qualify for government benefits are sub-
ject to stringent judicial scrutiny. 4 This prevents legislators from
doing indirectly, through fiscal manipulation, what they cannot do
directly, i.e., unduly burden citizens' constitutional rights. 135 Rec-
ognizing this, the California Supreme Court in Myers, struck
down legislation which conditioned receipt of state pregnancy-re-
lated benefits on the forfeiture of the constitutional right to abor-
tion. The current CDC's abortion funding policy likewise condi-
131. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
132. Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 643 F. Supp. 1217
(D.N.J. 1986).
133. Id. at 1227.
134. As the California Supreme Court has stated: "There is no greater power than
the power of the purse. If the government can use it to nullify consitutional rights, by
conditioning benefits only upon the sacrifice of such rights, the Bill of Rights could eventu-
ally become a yellowing scrap of paper." Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 284, 625 P.2d at 801, 172
Cal. Rptr. at 888.
135. As stated by one scholar, the government cannot "achieve with carrots what [it]
is forbidden to achieve with sticks." L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 933 n.77
(1978).
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tions state aid on the forfeiture of the abortion right. This
Comment has shown that the CDC's policy, like the legislation
invalidated in Myers, cannot survive the judicial scrutiny it
demands.
Additionally, as a penal restriction, the CDC's abortion funding
policy does not further any interest society hopes to achieve when
it incarcerates criminals. The policy thus violates the right of in-
mates to be free from unnecessary intrusions into their civil liber-
ties. Inmates should retain the same right to abortion funding as
nonincarcerated women. Any attempt to restrict inmates' rights to
abortion funding is constitutionally intolerable.
Todd M. Vukson*
* This article is dedicated to my mother and late father, without whose love and
support I would not have come this far.
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